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Abstract
The present paper considers an evidence measure built under the likelihood ratio approach.
The resulting likelihood-ratio measure can be used for testing general hypotheses in a simple
manner. Moreover, it satisfies the entailment condition (the logical consequence), which is re-
quired to maintain a special type of coherence over the space of hypotheses. In this paper, we
study some important non-probabilistic properties of the likelihood-ratio measure for a given
observed sample. Its applicability in testing sharp and non-sharp statistical null hypotheses is
discussed. Some counter-examples to the likelihood principle are analyzed and a comparison
with the Bayesian approach is also established. It is presented an application to test if the
genotype frequencies of a given population are under the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium, under
inbreeding restrictions or under outbreeding restrictions.
Key-words: Classical Statistics; Evidence Measure; Hypothesis testing; Likelihood ratio
statistics; Possibility theory;
1 Introduction
1.1 Preliminaries
In statistics, one of the main interests is to make inferences about unknown quantities by using
probability measures. As all natural phenomena are contingent, the inferences about their state are
∗email: patriota@ime.usp.br; fax Brazil: +55 11 3091-6130; tel Canada: +1 613 562-5800 ext. 8304
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uncertain inferences. A typical type of uncertain inference is to verify if a specific (null) hypothesis
H is consistent or inconsistent with the observed data. In the classical statistics, p-values are often
used as measures for guiding this type of uncertain inference; the smaller is the p-value, the more
inconsistent is the tested hypothesis H with the observed data. For recent definitions of p-values
see, for instance, Bickel and Doksum (1977), Berger and Boos (1994), Mudholkar and Chaubey
(2009) and Patriota (2013). Couso and Sa´nches (2008) proposed a fuzzy p-value under imprecise
information about the observed quantities.
P -values were firstly popularized by Ronald Fisher in a series of works (Fisher, 1925, 1935a,b).
On the one hand, a small p-value indicates that “either an exceptionally rare chance has occurred
or the theory is not true” (Fisher, 1959, p. 39). On the other hand, a non-small p-value does not
suggest acceptation of the null hypothesis, since “there is no reason for believing that a hypothesis
has been proved to be true merely because it is not contradicted by the available facts” (Fisher,
1935c). In the development of a p-value, it is not mandatory to explicit all possible hypotheses.
In his time, Fisher computed a p-value by fixing only the null hypothesis H to be tested by
the observed facts; the negation of H was not defined and, therefore, it may contain much more
statements than the probabilistic theory can hold. This is a very general type of uncertain inference,
however, optimal procedures are difficult, if not impossible, to derive under this general scenario.
Neyman and Pearson (1933) showed that, under some regular conditions, there exists an optimal
test in terms of error rates for testing two simple hypotheses. Then, for a fixed level of significance
(probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true), there exists a test which provides
the highest probability to reject the null hypothesis when it is false. Karlin and Rubin (1956)
generalized the latter result to some types of composite hypotheses when the likelihood ratio
is monotone. The Fisherian and Neyman-Pearsonian approaches are competitive: the former
is related with general uncertain inference and the latter is related with decision theory. A p-
value is, in general, defined under a large scenario not being necessary to define an alternative
hypothesis, while the Neyman-Pearson procedure requires an alternative hypothesis to close the
universe of possible hypotheses. It is natural that some p-values defined under general scenarios
present inadequate behaviors under closed universe of hypotheses — some examples of inadequate
behavior of p-values are provided in Goodman and Royall (1988) and Pereira and Wechsler (1993).
Despite many differences of first principles, these two approaches (discussed above) share a
common feature, namely, both metrics that regulate the p-value and the critical region strongly
depend on each specific null hypothesis. That is, two different null hypotheses are not directly
comparable, since each null hypothesis uses different criteria based on different metrics. More
specifically, if H ′ and H ′′ are two null hypotheses such that H ′ implies H ′′, then, by the logical
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consequence, we expect to observe more evidence against H ′ than H ′′. This logical feature does not
occur for both approaches, since under each H ′ and H ′′ we have different metrics (Schervish, 1996;
Patriota, 2013). This issue is recurrently discussed in the statistical literature for advocating in
favor of the Bayesian inference, since the use of the posterior distribution guarantees the validity of
the logical consequence over the universe of hypotheses. The limitation, however, of the Bayesian
procedure is that if the set of statements in the null hypothesis has smaller dimension than the set
of statements in the alternative hypothesis, the best posterior probability for the null hypothesis
is zero regardless the observed sample. This is a limitation, since, in such cases, the posterior
distribution cannot provide a positive number to represent the conflicting degree between the
observed data and the claimed hypothesis (i.e., it was decided a priori).
In the statistical literature, virtually all existent proposals to make uncertain inferences are
based on probability measures. The classical approaches make uncertain inferences by considering
randomness as a property only of the sample space, i.e., no probability measures are defined over
the parameter space (in the parametric case). The Bayesian approach makes uncertain inferences
by considering that both sample and parameter spaces are subject to probabilistic uncertainties.
In this paper, we adopt the classical paradigm, therefore, probability measures are defined only
for the sample space, however, we show that the defined likelihood-ratio measure can play the role
of a posterior measure to make uncertain inferences. This present paper revisits the likelihood-
ratio measure, showing: 1) some of its properties not well explored in the statistical literature; 2)
that it satisfies the logical consequence and can be interpreted in terms of displacements from the
maximum likelihood; 3) that it can be used for testing very general null hypotheses; 4) that it is an
upper bound for posterior probabilities. We discuss some of its peculiar rules and how to interpret
it satisfactorily to make uncertain inferences.
The likelihood ratio approach has a long history in the statistical literature. Neyman and
Pearson (1933) demonstrated that the test based on the likelihood ratio statistics is the most
powerful one for a fixed level of significance under simple hypotheses. Birkes (1990) studied the
relation between generalized likelihood ratio tests and uniformly most powerful tests. Mudholkar
and Chaubey (2009) studied optimal features for some p-values based on the likelihood ratio
statistics for very general null hypotheses. Sprott (2000) provided examples for confidence regions
not based on the likelihood ratio statistics that produce absurd regions. Severini (2000) discussed
likelihood methods in statistics and provided also, on page 79, a counter-example to the likelihood
principle — we discuss this example in Section 2.5. Royall (1997) examined the likelihood ratio
to quantify the weight of evidence for one hypothesis over another and provided many examples
and limitations of the traditional statistical inference. Royall (2000) investigated the probability of
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observing misleading evidence for the likelihood ratio approach. Giant and Shenoy (2005) justified
an axiomatic system of decision theory by using the likelihood ratio approach. Blume (2008)
provided a tutorial on likelihood methods for measuring statistical evidence. More recently, Bickel
(2012) generalized the law of likelihood for composite hypotheses and derived several properties.
These authors postulate the existence of a true probability the governs the data behavior, but this
“true” probability can always be understood just as a shorthand to a more complex interpretation
without adopting a realist perspective. Patriota (2013) built a measure of evidence based on
likelihood-ratio confidence regions and compared this measure with a specific p-value approach.
In the present paper, we discuss and provide some interpretations for the likelihood-ratio measure
with the purpose of revitalizing and reinforcing the use of this (new/old) measure in the discipline
of Statistics.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Subsection 1.2 presents some notations used in this
paper, Section 2 defines the likelihood-ratio measure and exposes some properties not well known in
the statistical literature, Subsection 2.2 illustrates the methodology with the Binomial, Poisson and
Normal distributions, Subsection 2.3 provides a comparison with the Bayesian approach. Relations
with previous works are presented in Subsection 2.4, some criticisms of the likelihood approach are
addressed in Subsection 2.5. Section 3 discusses how to test sharp and non-sharp hypotheses with
the likelihood-ratio measure, Subsections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 explore each scenario for two hypotheses.
Finally, Section 4 presents an application to the Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium.
1.2 Notations
In this paper we adopt the set-measure representation, because it is simple, elegant, powerful and it
avoids ambiguity. The statistical model is the triplet (X ,F ,P), where X ⊆ Rn is the sample space,
F is a list of measurable subsets of X (a sigma-field) and P is a family of well-defined probability
measures that possibly explain the observed data. Here, each measure in P ∈ P is dominated by
a sigma-finite measure µ (that is, µ(A) = 0⇒ P (A) = 0 for all P ∈ P and A ∈ F). The likelihood
function is then formally defined to be one version of the Radon-Nikodym derivative
L(P, x) ∈ dP
dµ
(x), such that P (A) =
∫
A
L(P, x)dµ(x),
where x ∈ X , A ∈ F , P ∈ P and dPdµ (x) is a set containing all versions that are equal except for
a set of µ-measure zero. Naturally, L(P, x) must be a non-pathological version in dPdµ (x), i.e., it is
assumed that
0 < sup
P∈P
L(P, x), for all x ∈ X (C1)
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holds. The Condition (C1) will guarantee valid many of the properties presented in this paper. If
this supremum is zero for some x ∈ X , then the family P in the statistical model was not well
defined and should be replaced by an appropriated family.
The majority of statistical models can be represented by the triplet (X ,F ,P), for instance,
regression models, mixed models, structural models, multivariate models, non-parametric models
and so forth. The parametric model emerges when there exists a finite dimensional space Θ ⊆ Rk,
with k <∞, such that P = {Pθ : θ ∈ Θ}. In the first part of the paper, the vector θ is considered
to be a fixed indexer of probabilities, i.e., no prior probability over Θ is specified. In the second
part, the results derived in this paper are compared with the Bayesian approach and, under this
framework, a prior over Θ is specified.
Some statisticians are habituated to start the modeling by defining the density functions or
conditional density functions of the involved random variables. These modellings can always be
rewritten in terms of the above triplet. For instance, in the former case: let X ∈ X be a random
vector such that X ∼ fθ(·), where fθ is a probability density function and θ ∈ Θ ⊆ Rk. The
statistical model is recovered by noting that F = β(X ) is the Borel σ-field for X and Pθ(A) =∫
A
fθ(x)dx, where A ∈ F . Thus, the triplet emerges (X ,F ,P), where P = {Pθ : θ ∈ Θ ⊆ Rk}.
If X is discrete, then F = 2X and Pθ(X = x) ≡ fθ(x). In a more general case, when X is a
mixture of discrete and continuous processes, the statistical model (X ,F ,P) may be seen as an
induced model by the random variable X : (Ω,A,M)→ (X ,F ,P), where the family of probability
measures M must be dominated by a sigma-finite measure. For conditional specifications, we
have, for instance, the following: let X ∈ X and γ ∈ Γ ⊆ Rp be two continuous random vectors,
defined on the same space, such that X|γ ∼ g(·|γ) and γ ∼ piθ(·). The variable γ is, in general,
not observable. The statistical model is defined just for observable variables, therefore, in this case
we must compute the marginal density of X by integrating the joint distribution over Γ, namely,
fθ(x) =
∫
Γ
g(x|γ)piθ(γ)dγ and now we back to the former case (the discrete case is analogous).
In other words, we always use the marginal statistical model related with the observable random
variables, because the likelihood function for the joint vectors (X, γ) depend on the non-observable
random vector γ.
All statistical hypotheses contain only statements about subsets of P, i.e., all hypotheses should
be of the type: H ≡ H(P0) ≡ “The family P0 contains at least one probability measure that
potentially generates the data behavior”, where P0 ⊆ P. A short notation to represent the same
will be preferred, namely, “H : P ∈ P0” . In this paper, the universe of hypotheses restricted
to the family P is defined by H = {H(P0) : P0 ⊆ P}. The two extreme cases are H(∅) and
H(P), we shall see in this paper that the likelihood-ratio measure sets impossibility for the former
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and full possibility for the latter. Moreover, we consider here that H(P0) ∨H(P1) ≡ H(P0 ∪ P1)
and H(P0) ∧ H(P1) ≡ H(P0 ∩ P1). As for each P0 ⊆ P we have a hypothesis H(P0) ∈ H,
the same measure defined over the subsets of P can also be defined over H. Note that, if P is
uncountable, then, by using the choice axiom, it is not possible to define a probability measure
over H (some elements are not measurable in the probabilistic sense), in contrast, we shall see that
the likelihood-ratio measure is well defined for testing all elements of H.
2 The likelihood-ratio measure
Why use the likelihood for measuring the consistence of a hypothesis? First, the likelihood function
is a non-negative function that relates each unobservable probability measure P ∈ P with an
observable data x ∈ X . Second, the larger is the value of L(P, x), the better is the agreement
between the probability P and the observed data, see the law of likelihood discussed in (Hacking,
1965, p. 71). According to the measure theory, L(P, x) is one version of the Radon-Nikodym
derivative of P with respect to µ at the point x. In the discrete case, the likelihood function is
L(P, x) = P (X = x), then L ranks the probabilities in P from those that make x most probable to
those that make x less probable. In the continuous case, it can be interpreted as the instantaneous
rate of change of P at x, then L ranks the probabilities in P from those with the high instantaneous
rate of change at x to those with small instantaneous rate of change at x.
The likelihood ratio statistic is defined by
λ(P, x) =
L(P, x)
supP∈P L(P, x)
, (2.1)
for P ∈ P and x ∈ X ∗ ≡ {w ∈ X : supP∈P L(P,w) < ∞}. The set X ∗ is important to restrict
the observed values to the cases where the likelihood ratio statistic (2.1) is well-defined. If it is
observed x 6∈ X ∗, then λ will be ill-defined and other definition should be used. In this paper,
besides condition (C1), it is assumed also that x ∈ X ∗ throughout this paper.
2.1 Definition and properties
Definition 2.1. For each fixed x ∈ X ∗, let νx : 2P → [0, 1] be a set function such that
νx(P1) = sup
P∈P1
λ(P, x) and νx(∅) = 0, (2.2)
where P1 ⊆ P is a non-empty set. We call νx by likelihood-ratio measure (LR-measure).
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By Condition (C1), the LR-measure νx is a well-defined function over 2
P . This measure νx is
known in the statistical literature as the general likelihood ratio statistic and it is typically used
for building hypothesis testings and confidence regions. Although, it is known many (asymptotic)
properties of νx(P1) when x varies over X , little is known about its properties for a fixed x ∈ X ∗.
By knowing the properties of νx, for a fixed sample x, it is possible to derive rules to identify
which probabilities in P are more plausible to explain this observed data. The repeated sampling
principle will not be considered as a criterion to specify the plausibility of the subsets of P, since
x is fixed and observed.
An axiomatic approach for decision theory based on νx was developed by Giant and Shenoy
(2005) considering a parametric model. It is also possible to extend their axiomatic theory to the
general statistical model considered here (not necessarily parametric), but it is not the main goal
of the present paper.
In the following, some properties of νx are attained straightforwardly from its definition, which
explicit that νx is a non-additive measure — see Denneberg (1994), for details on non-additive
measures. Let P1,P2 ⊆ P, then
P1. νx(P) = 1 and νx(∅) = 0;
P2. νx(P1 ∪ P2) = max{νx(P1), νx(P2)};
P3. if P1 is non-empty, then νx(P1) = supP∈P1 νx({P});
P4. if P1 ⊆ P2, then νx(P1) ≤ νx(P2) (the entailment condition).
The above properties P1–P3 indicate that νx is a possibility measure over the subsets of P (see
Zadeh, 1978, for details on possibility measures). Property P4 says that the LR-measure satisfies
the entailment condition. By these properties, it is possible to prescribe how to infer by using the
LR-measure for a fixed sample x ∈ X ∗.
First, notice that by P1 and P2, νx(P1) = 1 or νx(Pc1) = 1 for any P1 ⊆ P and, also, on the
contrary to the probability rules,
νx(P1) = 1 6⇒ νx(Pc1) = 0. (2.3)
In words: if no evidence against P1 is observed, then it does not imply that full evidence against
Pc1 is observed. This is in accordance with the coherent reasoning, since, by definition, νx(P1) =
1 means that there exists P ∈ P1 with (almost) maximum likelihood and νx(Pc1) = 0 means
that all P ∈ Pc1 have zero likelihood. That is, νx indicates a type of consistency degrees rather
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than probability degrees. Some statisticians might find the above properties undesirable, for one
cannot use all known theorems from the probability theory, moreover, the probability axioms
have justifications in terms of desiderata (de Finetti, 1931; Cox, 1946; Paris, 2006) and wages (de
Finetti, 1931). Nonetheless, these justifications are not provided only for the probability axioms,
the possibility axioms also have such justifications (see Marichal, 2000; Dubois et al., 2008, for
instance). The first three evident interpretations of the LR-measure follows:
(A) νx(P1) = 1 occurs whenever the observed data do not bring information against P1, according
to the likelihood function. That is, P1 is consistent with the observed data.
(B) νx(P1) < 1 occurs whenever the observed data do bring some information against P1, accord-
ing to the likelihood function. That is, P1 has some inconsistence degree with the observed
data.
(C) νx(P1) < νx(P2) occurs whenever the observed data do bring more information against P1
than against P2, according to the likelihood function. That is, P1 is more inconsistence with
the observed data than P2.
From P1–P4 and (A)–(B), it is possible to devise more three interpretations that will be used on
hypothesis testings.
(D) if νx({P}) = 1 for all P ∈ P, then all elements of P are equally possible. This happens
because all probability measures reach the maximum likelihood and, therefore, all measures
are equally consistent with the observed data, given the family P.
(E) if νx({P0}) = 1 and νx({P}) = 0 for all P ∈ P\{P0}, then the observed data indicate necessity
of P0 and impossibility, in terms of likelihoods, for all other P ∈ P\{P0}. This happens
because only P0 reaches the maximum likelihood and all others P have zero likelihood. In
this context, P0 is the only measure consistent with the observed data while all the others
are totally inconsistent, given the family P.
(F) if νx(P0) = 1 and νx(Pc0) ≈ 0 (near zero), then the observed data bring strong evidence
against Pc0 . This happens because only probability measures in P0 reach the maximum
likelihood while its complement yields very low likelihoods. Here, P1 is consistent with the
observed data and its complement is strongly inconsistent, given the family P.
In order to make interpretations in terms of percentages of the maximum likelihood, let P0 be a
closed set and if for each fixed x ∈ X ∗ there exists at least one measure in P that reaches the
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maximum likelihood, that is,
Pˆx =
{
P ∈ P : νx(P ) = 1
} 6= ∅, (2.4)
then
the quantity νx(P0) = ν0 indicates that the highest likelihood produced by the elements
of P0 equals ν0100% of the maximum likelihood.
It is easy to verify this claim, since by condition (2.4) and the closure of P0, we have
νx(P0) = maxP∈P0 L(P, x)
maxP∈P L(P, x)
= ν0 ⇒ max
P∈P0
L(P, x) = ν0 max
P∈P
L(P, x).
That is, in this context, νx(P0) provides a number for the best possible choice in P0 in terms of
maximum likelihood proportions. In any case, the smaller is the value of νx(P0), the farther is
the set P0 from the best possible choices in P. If all elements of P0 generate small likelihoods
compared to the maximum likelihood, the set P0 must be considered “improvable” or “implausi-
ble” in the sense that the observed data are not corroborating to any element of P0. For many
regular statistical models, the set Pˆx contains just one element, which is known as the maximum
likelihood estimative. However, in our general setting, the family P may contain models that
are not identifiable and therefore the set Pˆx will contain more than one element. For instance,
let X = R and each Pθ ∈ P is a normal probability with variance one and mean µ1 + µ2. The
parameter vector in this example is θ = (µ1, µ2) and, for this case, for each x ∈ X , we have
Pˆx =
{
Pθ ∈ P : θ = (x − a, a), a ∈ R
}
. Notice that, any set P0 ⊆ P such that P0 ∩ Pˆx 6= ∅
will have full LR-measure (full possibility) for a fixed x ∈ X ∗, that is, νx(P0) = 1. In other words,
the lack of identifiability is not an impediment to make inferences under the LR-measure. The
identifiability of parameters is required to guarantee asymptotic properties of the maximum likeli-
hood estimators (uniqueness, consistency, etc.), as we are dealing with a pure statistical model and
families of probabilities rather than parameter spaces, this condition is not necessary. Naturally,
the identifiability can help to have more precise inference, but it is not strictly needed here.
In order to elaborate any conclusions about the amount of evidence against P0, by the relation
exposed in Equation (2.3), it is mandatory to compute either νx(P0) and νx(Pc0) and compare
their values properly. As we see above, the LR-measure possesses properties that differ very much
from the p-value, posterior distributions and Bayes Factors. However, its properties are sufficiently
precise to make consistent inferences. See Subsection 2.2 for some illustrative examples, Section
2.3 for a comparison with the Bayesian procedure and Section 3 for a discussion on conducting
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hypothesis testings.
In order to provide a geometrical interpretation of the LR-measure, Lemma 2.1 offers an equiv-
alent definition for νx.
Lemma 2.1. For each P ∈ P and x ∈ X ∗,
νx({P}) = sup{α ∈ [0, 1] : Λα(x) ∩ {P} 6= ∅},
where
Λα(x) = {P ∈ P : λ(P, x) ≥ α}, (2.5)
The proof is straightforward, since for each x ∈ X ∗ and P ∈ P
{
α ∈ [0, 1] : Λα(x) ∩ {P} 6= ∅
} ≡ {α ∈ [0, 1] : λ(P, x) ≥ α} ≡ [0, λ(P, x)].
Lemma 2.1 helps us to interpret graphically the distance between a specific probability measure
P and the set containing elements with the highest likelihood Pˆx. Assuming valid (2.4), the set
Λα(x) contains all measures P such that L(P, x) ≥ αmaxP∈P L(P, x). Moreover, the set Pˆx can
be seen as the center of Λα(x) in the following sense: Pˆx ⊆ Λα for all α ∈ [0, 1].
From Lemma 2.1 and properties P1 and P3, the following general form is attained
νx(P1) = max{0, sup{α ∈ (0, 1) : Λα(x) ∩ P1 6= ∅}}, (2.6)
for any subfamily P1 ⊆ P, where sup(∅) = −∞. It is noteworthy that Equation (2.6) is similar to
the one proposed by Patriota (2013), see Definition 2.3 of the latter paper. The main difference is
that, in Patriota (2013), Λα was defined, under a parametric context, by the confidence region built
on the likelihood ratio statistics. Later on, Martin and Liu (2014) and Martin (2014) presented
some discussions similar to those in Patriota (2013).
It is useful to specialize the above results to the parametric model P = {Pθ : Θ ⊂ Rk}, where
k <∞. In this context, all quantities can be written in terms of the parametric subspaces
Λα(x) = {θ ∈ Θ : λ(Pθ, x) ≥ α} and νx(Θ1) = max{0, sup{α ∈ (0, 1) : Λα(x) ∩Θ1 6= ∅}}.
In practice, it is possible to represent graphically the relation with P0 and Pˆx by the set Λν0(x),
where ν0 = ν(P0). The set Λν0(x) highlights the distance between P0 and Pˆx, i.e., the more distant
is the border of Λν0 from its center, the more implausible is P0 for the given observed data x, see
10
Section 4 for an application.
To sum up, this section presented and discussed some important properties P1–P4 of the LR-
measure and their interpretative implications (A)–(F) that were not well-explored in the statistical
literature. By using these properties, it is possible to create a ranking of all subsets of P (or subsets
of Θ, in the parametric context) describing the degree of adequacy according to their respective
likelihood values.
2.2 Some illustrative examples
In order to illustrate the simplicity of the methodology, we present three simple examples from
Binomial, Poisson and Normal distributions in Figures 1, 2 and 3, respectively. As we shall see,
this methodology can be easily applied by any undergraduate student.
The genuine likelihood functions are employed for each example. In the normal case, we have
two parameters, namely, the location µ and scale σ2, but here we will be interested in verifying
the plausibility of σ2 ≤ 1.5. In this context, µ can be considered as a nuisance parameter, as we
shall see it is not necessary to resort to integrated or profiled likelihood functions.
Binomial example: Let X be a binomial random variable, i.e., X = {0, 1, . . . , n}, Pθ(X =
x) =
(
8
x
)
θx(1− θ)(8−x) for x ∈ X and θ ∈ Θ ≡ (0, 1). Figure 1 shows the values of likelihood-ratio
measure for all observable values from a Binomial random variable with n = 8, the full horizontal
segment represents the set Θ0 = [0.4, 0.6]. Here, the likelihood-ratio measure is
νx({θ}) =

θx(1− θ)(8−x)
(x8 )
x(1− x8 )(8−x)
, if x ∈ {1, . . . , 7}
θx(1− θ)(8−x), if x ∈ {0, 8}.
Observe that, for either x = 0 and x = 8, Figures 1(a) and (i) show that νx(Θ0) = 0.02 and
νx(Θ
c
0) = 1. That is, when x = 0 (or x = 8), on the one hand, Pc0 = {Pθ : θ ∈ Θc0} contains the
probability that generates the highest likelihood and, on the other hand, the likelihoods produced
by the elements of P0 = {Pθ : θ ∈ Θ0} reach at most 2% of the maximum likelihood. For x = 4,
we have νx(Θ0) = 1 and νx(Θ
c
0) = 0.85, that is, P0 contains the probability that generates the
highest likelihood and the likelihoods produced by the elements of Pc0 equal at most 85% of the
maximum likelihood.
Poisson example: Let X be a Poisson random variable, i.e., X = {0, 1, . . .}, Pθ(X = x) =
exp(−θ)θx/x! for x ∈ X and θ ∈ Θ ≡ (0,∞). Figure 2 depicts the values of the likelihood-ratio
measure for the first eight observable values from a Poisson random variable, the full horizontal
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segment represents the set Θ0 = [0, 3]. Here, the likelihood measure is
νx({θ}) =
 exp(x− θ)
(
θ
x
)x
, if x ∈ {1, 2, . . .}
exp(−θ), if x = 0.
When x = 0, Figure 2(a) shows that νx(Θ0) = 1.00 and νx(Θ
c
0) = 0.05. That is, when x = 0, on
the one hand, P0 = {Pθ : θ ∈ Θ0} contains the probability that generates maximum likelihood
and, on the other hand, the likelihoods produced by the elements of Pc0 = {Pθ : θ ∈ Θc0} equals
at most 5% of the maximum likelihood. When x = 8, Figure 2(i) shows that νx(Θ0) = 0.06 and
νx(Θ
c
0) = 1.00
Normal example: Let X be a normal sample, i.e., X = Rn, Pθ(A) =
∫
A
1
(
√
2piσ2)n
exp
( −
n
2σ2 (s
2
x + m
2
x − 2mxµ + µ2)
)
dx, where mx is the sample mean and s
2
x is the sample variance (the
denominator is n) and θ = (µ, σ2) ∈ Θ ≡ R × R+. In this case, we have two parameters and a
simple graphical visualization is through the set Λα. Figure 3 presents the smallest contour for
which Λα has at least one element in common with Θ0 = {(µ, σ2) ∈ Θ : σ2 ≤ 1.5} (the full line)
for some observable sample mean mx and variance s
2
x from a Normal sample of size n = 20, the
dashed area represents the set Θ0. Here, the likelihood measure is
νx({(µ, σ2)}) =
√
s2x
σ2
exp
(
− n
2σ2
(s2x +m
2
x − 2mxµ+ µ2) +
n
2
)
.
Observe that, the set Θ0 represents our interest in σ
2. The distance between the maximum
likelihood estimative and the border of Θ0 does not depend on µ. When the sample variance is
1, Figures 3(a)–(c) show that νx(Θ0) = 1.00 and νx(Θ
c
0) = 0.49. When the sample variance is 2,
Figures 3(d)–(f) show that νx(Θ0) = 0.63 and νx(Θ
c
0) = 1.00. Finally, when the sample variance
is 3, Figures 3(g)–(i) show that νx(Θ0) = 0.05 and νx(Θ
c
0) = 1.00. In the normal case, all of these
LR-measures do not depend on the sample mean value.
2.3 Comparison with the Bayesian approach
In the Bayesian inference, all inferences are based on the posterior probability defined over the
parameter space. In this paper, it was studied an inference procedure based on a possibility
measure over the same parameter space rather than a probability one. This section provides a
comparison of these two strictly different approaches under parametric models. As these two
procedures use different rules, they must have different interpretation.
In the Bayesian framework, a prior probability pi(θ) (dominated by a sigma-finite measure ξ)
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Figure 1: Likelihood-ratio measures for Θ0 = [0.4, 0.6] for all observable values from a Binomial
random variable with n = 8. The horizontal full segment represents the set Θ0. The full dot
represents the value of νx(Θ0) in the normalized likelihood.
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Figure 2: Likelihood-ratio measures for Θ0 = [0, 3] for the eight first observable values from a
Poisson random variable. The horizontal full segment represents the set Θ0. The full dot represents
the value of νx(Θ0) in the normalized likelihood.
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Figure 3: Likelihood-ratio measures for Θ0 = {(µ, σ2) ∈ Θ : σ2 ≤ 1.5} for some observable values
of the sample mean and variance from a random sample of a Normal distribution with n = 20.
The cross mark is the maximum likelihood estimate. The set Θ0 is represented by the dashed area.
The full line is the smallest contour for which Λα has at least one element in common with Θ0.
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is defined over the parameter space Θ and a posterior is attained through
f(θ|X = x)dξ(θ) = L(Pθ, x)dpi(θ)
m(x)
,
where m(x) =
∫
Θ
L(Pθ, x)dpi(θ). This posterior distribution is a well-defined measure of support
over the measurable subsets of Θ, i.e., the posterior probability of Θ0 given the observed data x is
defined by
pix(Θ0) =
∫
Θ0
f(θ|X = x)dξ(θ),
where the integral is the Lebesgue integral. If pix(Θ0) is very small, then the set Θ0 must be
regarded as improbable. The value pix(Θ
c
0) is completely determined by knowing pix(Θ0), since
pix(Θ
c
0) = 1− pix(Θ0). Then,
0 < pix(Θ0) < pix(Θ1) < 1⇔ pix(Θc0) > pix(Θc1).
This feature does not hold for the LR-measure νx, e.g., for the same observed sample x we may
have νx(Θ0) = 0.5⇒ νx(Θc0) = 1 and νx(Θ1) = 0.8⇒ νx(Θc1) = 1 (these implications are valid by
Properties P1 and P2), that is,
0 < νx(Θ0) < νx(Θ1) < 1 6⇒ νx(Θc0) > νx(Θc1). (2.7)
In words, although there is an increasing in the νx-values from Θ0 to Θ1, the νx-values of Θ
c
0 and
Θc1 are the very same. Secondly, as the sum rule governs the posterior probability measure, the
probability of an uncountable set cannot be recovered from the probabilities of each of its elements.
It does not occur with νx(·), since, by definition, the νx-value of an uncountable set is obtained
from the νx-value of each of its constituents through the supremum function. This feature poses
the LR-measure νx in advantage when it comes to testing sharp hypothesis of the type: “the
probability Pθ0 potentially generates the observed data”, since whenever Θ is uncountable, the
posterior probability will attach probability zero to the above quoted event even when Pθ0 fits
adequately the observed data.
The LR-measure can be viewed as a classical counterpart of the posterior distribution, never-
theless, as it has seen above, the rules that govern both measures are quite different and hence the
interpretations must differ. The following result explicits a relation between νx and any posterior
probability.
Lemma 2.2. Let (X ,F ,P) be a statistical model where P = {Pθ : θ ∈ Θ ⊆ Rk} is a parametric
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probability family (dominated by a sigma-finite measure) and k < ∞. Also, let pi be a prior
probability (dominated by a sigma-finite measure) defined over a measurable list of subsets of Θ.
Assume valid Condition (C1), then, for any pi-measurable Θ0 such that pi(Θ0) > 0,
νx(Θ0) ≥ pix(Θ0)m(x)
pi(Θ0)c(x)
,
for any x ∈ X ∗, where c(x) = supPθ∈P L(Pθ, x).
Proof. As x ∈ X ∗ and c(x) <∞, the posterior probability can be written as
pix(Θ0) =
c(x)
m(x)
∫
Θ0
λ(Pθ, x)dpi(θ) ≤ c(x)
m(x)
pi(Θ0) sup
θ∈Θ0
λ(Pθ, x), (2.8)
therefore
νx(Θ0) ≥ pix(Θ0)m(x)
pi(Θ0)c(x)
.
It is noteworthy that νx is defined over the power set of Θ, while the posterior distribution is
defined on the measurable subsets (in the Lebesgue sense) of Θ. Thus, there exist subsets of Θ that
are not measurable for pix but are computable for νx. Notice that, from Equation (2.8) of Lemma
2.2, νx(Θ0) = 0 ⇒ pix(Θ0) = 0 but the converse is not true, for there exist prior probabilities
that induce probability zero for Θ0 even when supθ∈Θ0 λ(Pθ, x) > 0. This shows that the νx-value
behavior is in agreement with the expected reasoning between possibility and probability:
“a high degree of possibility does not imply a high degree of probability, nor does a
low degree of probability imply a low degree of possibility. However, if an event is
impossible, it is bound to be improbable.” (Zadeh, 1978)
Moreover, Lemma 2.2 provides an upper bound for the posterior probability of Θ0.
Corollary 2.1. Assume valid the Lemma 2.2’s assumptions. Then, for each pi-measurable Θ0 such
that pi(Θ0) ≤ m(x)c(x) ,
pix(Θ0) ≤ νx(Θ0).
Notice that the extra condition of the Corollary 2.1 is not vacuous, since m(x)c(x) ≤ 1 by the
following
m(x) =
∫
Θ
L(θ, x)dpi(θ) ≤ sup
θ∈Θ
L(Pθ, x)pi(Θ) = c(x).
Corollary 2.1 is valid for subsets of Θ with low prior probabilities relative to m(x)/c(x).
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Dubois and Prade (1982) argued that a consistency principle between probability and possi-
bility can be mathematically stated as Probability(A) ≤ Possibility(A) for all measurable A (in
a probability sense). The possibility of an event is interpreted by Shackle (1961) as “the lack of
surprise when it occurs”. Based on this interpretation, Dubois and Prade (1982) claim: “An event
that often occurs is not very surprising and then it seems very possible that it happens; on the
other hand, events which are not very possible do not often occur and are surprising. Then by an
inductive reasoning, we are conducted to suppose that if an event seldom occurs, it must be less
possible than events which often occur.” Corollary 2.1 establishes when this consistency principle
occurs for posterior probabilities and the LR-measure.
It is worth saying that only optimization procedures are required in the computation of νx(Θ0),
no integrations are required. Computing a posterior probability can be a harsh task in some high
dimensional problems, therefore, an upper bound of the posterior probability can be attained by
Lemma 2.2 and Corollary 2.1 in terms of νx. That is, if the νx-value is small for an event, then
the correlative posterior probability must be even smaller (under the specified conditions).
2.4 Other works on the Likelihood-ratio approach
Unfortunately, in the statistical literature there are few works addressing the likelihood approach
in the context of the present paper. The law of likelihood to compare two hypotheses was studied
by Royall (1997), Royall (2000) and Bickel (2012), this law of likelihood can be represented by
using our notation as follows
Rx(P1,P2) = νx(P1)
νx(P2) (2.9)
provided that, νx(P2) > 0. In our paper the likelihood-ratio measure is relative to the maximum
likelihood, that is, all possibly computed likelihoods for the family P are compared with the highest
likelihood. Some features of Rx can be derived by using the properties P1–P4 and (A)–(F), but
this is not the focus of the present paper.
In a paper published by the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Walley and Moral (1999)
proposed two methods based on likelihoods for statistical models with a finite parametric space
Θ = {θ1, . . . , θr}. The methods are 1) the upper and lower probabilities defined, respectively, by
P 1(Θ0|x) = max{L(θ, x) : θ ∈ Θ0} and P 1(Θ0|x) = 1− P 1(Θc0|x)
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and 2) the Bayesian posterior probability derived from a uniform prior distribution
P2(Θ0|x) =
∑
θ∈Θ0
L(θ, x)∑
θ∈Θ
L(θ, x)
.
The authors defined types of likelihood measures that satisfy some properties of a probability
measure. Some works in the Fuzzy literature use measures based on likelihoods, but none of them
address the point treated in this paper. For instance, Dubois et al. (1997) studied the semantics for
possibility theory based on likelihoods. Their work considers a different type of likelihood measure,
which in a sense is related with the LR-measure. The main interest in their paper lies in subsets
of the observable set X . They defined for A ⊆ X
pi(a) = sup
P∈P
P (B|a) and Π(A) = sup
a∈A
pi(a),
see the bottom the page 363 of their paper. This measure is defined over the subsets of X , while
νx is defined over the subsets of P. That is, Π : 2X → [0, 1], while νx : 2P → [0, 1], their domains
are different.
In the Artificial Intelligence Journal, Giant and Shenoy (2005) proposed an axiomatic decision
theory based on νx under parametric models. Therefore, justifications in terms of lost functions
are also available for the likelihood-ratio measure.
2.5 Criticisms and limitations of the likelihood ratio approach
In this paper, we consider only the information provided by the ‘observed’ likelihood and external
information sources are not used (so far, it was not necessary to resort on the repeating sam-
pling principle). Despite that, in this paper we are not embracing the likelihood principle as the
only principle to make good inferences. There are some examples, based on anomalous likelihood
functions, illustrating that information beyond the likelihood function is necessary for proper sta-
tistical inference (Fraser et al., 1985; Severini, 2000, example 3.5). In this section, we discuss the
first anomalous (flat) likelihood function presented in Fraser et al. (1985) and the Example 3.5
presented in Severini (2000).
Fraser, Monete and Ng’s Example: Let (X ,F ,P) such that X = {1, 2, . . .}, F = 2X and
P = {Pθ : θ ∈ {1, 2, . . .}}, where Pθ is defined as follows
Pθ(X = x) =

1
3 , for x =
⌊
θ
2
⌋
, 2θ, 2θ + 1,
0, otherwise,
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where b·c denotes the greatest integer smaller or equal to the argument. For a given x, the likelihood
function is
L(θ, x) =

1
3 , for θ =
⌊
x
2
⌋
, 2x, 2x+ 1,
0, otherwise,
and the likelihood-ratio measure is
νx({θ}) =
 1, for θ =
⌊
x
2
⌋
, 2x, 2x+ 1,
0, otherwise.
That is, in this example, for a given x, the LR-measure indicates possibility one for θ =
bx/2c, 2x, 2x+ 1 and impossibility for any other values. That is all the information we can extract
from the likelihood-ratio measure. However, “the smallest of the three possible θ values provides
a confidence procedure with 2/3 confidence” (Fraser et al., 1985), i.e.,
Pθ
(⌊
X
2
⌋
= θ
)
= Pθ
({
x ∈ X :
⌊
x
2
⌋
= θ
})
= Pθ
(
X ∈
{
2θ, 2θ + 1
})
=
2
3
. (2.10)
It means that there is an external information that is not regarded in the likelihood-ratio
measure and can help to discriminate which values are more probable than others. However, the
procedure (2.10) uses the “repeated sampling principle”, that is, if the experiment is repeated,
the quantity bX2 c will be equal to θ, in average and under the law Pθ, 2/3 of times. Notice that
it does not mean at all that the statement “θ = bx2 c” is more plausible than the others, namely,
“θ = 2x” and “θ = 2x+1”, for a fixed observation x. For a fixed value x, all statements “θ = bx2 c”,
“θ = 2x” and “θ = 2x + 1” are equally plausible with respect to the likelihood-ratio measure.
Since the underlying principles are different, the two interpretations must be different, therefore
one should not be used as a counter-argument for the other.
Severini’s Example: Let (X ,F ,P) such that X = {1, 2, . . .}, F = 2X and P = {Pθ : θ ∈
{1, 2, . . .}}, where Pθ is defined as follows: if θ = 1 or θ is even, then
Pθ(X = x) =

1
3 , for x =
⌈
θ
2
⌉
, 2θ, 2θ + 1,
0, otherwise,
where d·e denotes the smallest integer greater or equal to the argument. If θ is an odd number
20
greater than one, then
Pθ(X = x) =

10
24 , for x = (θ − 1)/2,
7
24 , for x = 2θ, 2θ + 1,
0, otherwise.
For a given x, the likelihood function is
L(θ, x) =

1
3 , if x =
⌈
θ
2
⌉
, 2θ, 2θ + 1 and θ = 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, . . . ,
10
24 , if x = (θ − 1)/2 and θ = 3, 5, 7, 9, . . . ,
7
24 , if x = 2θ, 2θ + 1 and θ = 3, 5, 7, 9, . . . ,
0, otherwise,
and the likelihood-ratio measure is given by
νx({θ}) =

8
10 , if x =
⌈
θ
2
⌉
, 2θ, 2θ + 1 and θ = 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, . . . ,
1, if x = (θ − 1)/2 and θ = 3, 5, 7, 9, . . . ,
7
10 , if x = 2θ, 2θ + 1 and θ = 3, 5, 7, 9, . . . ,
0, otherwise.
Clearly, the likelihood-ratio measure indicates that “θ = 2x+1” produces the highest likelihood,
the other possible values (with positive LR-measure) attain at least 70% of the maximum likelihood.
Nonetheless, note that this point with the highest likelihood has probability
Pθ(2X + 1 = θ) =
 0, if θ is even or equal to 110
24 , otherwise.
Define the statistic
T (x) =

x−1
2 , if x is odd and x > 1⌈
x
2
⌉
, otherwise.
Severini (2000), on page 80, shows that
Pθ(T (X) = θ) ≥ 14
24
>
10
24
≥ Pθ(2X + 1 = θ),
which proofs that “the point with smaller likelihood is more likely to be equal to θ [than the point
with the highest likelihood]” (Severini, 2000, p. 80). For this latter conclusion to be valid, the
repeated sampling principle must be evoked, because the word likely is restricted to ensembles of
the sample space.
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In these two examples and in many others, the repeated sampling principle is embraced only
rhetorically and, in general, it is not effectively executed in the majority of actual problems. That
is, one sample is observed and a conclusion should be drawn from this single observed sample. As
this principle is not universally accepted, I strongly believe that these examples do not produce
a valid contra-argument against the likelihood-ratio measure. Personally, I did not reject the
repeated sampling principle, but I strongly believe that it (or any other principle) should not be
imposed to drive all types of uncertain inferences, mainly inasmuch as there are some examples
where methods with good long run properties are inadmissible and incoherent in a specific sense.
3 Sharp and non-sharp hypothesis testings
Besides being applied as a support measure over the subsets of P, the LR-measure νx may also
be employed for testing a null hypothesis H0 : P ∈ P0. Here, two types of hypothesis testings
can be conducted, one based on Fisherian philosophy and another based on the Neyman-Pearson
philosophy. The Fisherian philosophy considers that the family P cannot exhaustively list all
mechanisms that possibly generate the observed sample, therefore, the alternative hypothesis is
always ill-defined and it is only reasonable to reject the null hypothesis. The Neyman-Pearson
philosophy considers that the family may list exhaustively all possible mechanisms that generate the
observed data and, given this family, the alternative hypothesis is well-defined and it is reasonable
to accept or to reject the null hypothesis.
The hypothesis H0 is sharp when dim(P0) < dim(P) and it is non-sharp when dim(P0) =
dim(P), where dim() is the Lebesgue dimension. On the one hand, in a general setting, it is
non-trivial to compute p-values for non-sharp hypotheses, since, depending on the geometry of P0,
the limiting distribution of the usual likelihood ratio statistics may be other than the chi-square
distribution (see Drton, 2009, for specific details). As the Wald and Score statistics are connected
with the likelihood ratio statistic, the same issue is expected to occur with these statistics. A
study on optimal p-values under special cases of sharp and non-sharp null hypotheses is provided
in Mudholkar and Chaubey (2009). On the other hand, under sharp null hypotheses, the posterior
probability cannot provide a positive measure and the alternative Bayes factor is not a consistent
measure (see Lavine and Schervish, 1999, for details). In contrast, we shall see in this section
that the LR-measure νx can consistently test sharp or non-sharp hypotheses. Condition (C1) is
considered valid throughout this section.
If the practitioner follows the Fisherian philosophy, then the decision of rejection is taken if the
LR-measure νx(P0) is small. If the practitioner adopts the Neyman-Pearson philosophy, then the
22
acceptation/rejection of H0 varies according to three different situations:
1. H0 and H1 are both non-sharp hypotheses (see Section 3.1),
2. H0 is sharp and H1 is non-sharp (see Section 3.2),
3. H0 is non-sharp and H1 is sharp (see Section 3.3).
For each of these situations, we have different types of decisions. It is very important to treat each
case particularly, since for each case we have different degrees of restrictiveness. In the following,
we define conditions that indicate a rejection or acceptation of H0.
Definition 3.1. There are indications to reject H0 (or accept H1), given the family P, when
(i) the observed data bring (strong) evidence against H0, i.e., νx(P0) ≈ 0 (small enough);
(ii) the observed data bring no evidence against H1, i.e., νx(Pc0) = 1.
When the observed data do not provide evidence against H0, i.e., νx(P0) = 1, by the proper-
ties of νx, it does not necessarily imply that the same data provide strong evidence against the
alternative H1. If this occurs, we have indications to accept H0. Then, we define conditions for
accepting H0.
Definition 3.2. There are indications to accept H0 (or reject H1), given the family P, when
(i) the observed data bring no evidence against H0, i.e., νx(P0) = 1;
(ii) the observed data bring strong evidence against H1, i.e., νx(Pc0) ≈ 0 (small enough).
That is, it is not sufficient to observe “no evidence” against H0 to accept H0, also it is necessary
to observe (strong) evidence against H1. If min(νx(P0), νx(Pc0)) is not small enough, then there are
no indications to either reject or accept the null hypothesis. In this latter case, we should maintain
both hypotheses and collect more data or more information to make further conclusions. It must be
clear that we can only accept H0 restricted to the options in P, it is not an unconditional decision,
it is a decision given the family of possible choices P. Furthermore, it is not conditional in the
probabilistic sense, it is conditional in the possibilistic sense, for there is no probability measure
over P.
It should be noticed that if the null hypothesis is H0 : P ∈ Pˆx, where Pˆx is defined in (2.4), then,
by Definitions 3.2 and 3.1, we should only accept this hypothesis if νx(Pˆcx) ≈ 0 (small enough).
For instance,
Binomial example: let X = {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}, Pθ(X = k) =
(
n
k
)
θk(1 − θ)n−k and P = {Pθ :
θ ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.9}}, assume that n = 100 and the observed data is x = 99. Then, the LR-measure
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is νx({Pθ}) = 10
(
θ
0.9
)99
(1 − θ) and Pˆx =
{
P0.9
}
. If the null hypothesis is H0 : P ∈ Pˆx, we have
νx(Pˆx) = 1 and νx(Pˆcx) ≈ 10−64, therefore, given this family P, we observe evidence to accept H0,
since the set Pˆcx = {P0.1, P0.2} is almost impossible.
Define Φx : 2
P → [0, 1]× [0, 1] such that
Φx(P0) = 〈νx(P0), νx(Pc0)〉
for each P0 ⊆ P. This function will be used for testing H0 against H1. Two extreme decisions
follow: Φx(P0) = 〈1, 0〉 is the maximal value for H0, therefore H0 should be readily accepted, for
the possibility of Pc0 is zero; Φx(P0) = 〈0, 1〉 is the minimal value for H0, therefore H0 should be
readily rejected, the possibility of P0 is zero.
The above prescriptions are just representing the properties of νx for any subset P0 ⊆ P.
In practice, it is observed something between the maximal and minimal values and the types of
decisions depend on the restrictiveness of the involved hypotheses.
3.1 H0 and H1 are both non-sharp hypotheses
In this section, H0 and H1 are both non-sharp hypotheses, that is, dim(P0) = dim(Pc0) = dim(P).
Two arrangements are possible, namely
(1) Φx(P0) = 〈1, b〉, with b ∈ [0, 1], if Pˆx ⊂ P0. In this first case, if b is sufficiently small, H0
should be accepted, given the family P.
(2) Φx(P0) = 〈a, 1〉, with a ∈ [0, 1], if Pˆx ⊂ Pc0 . In this second case, if a is sufficiently small, H0
should be rejected, given the family P.
Observe that, Φx(P0) = 〈1, 1〉 whenever Pˆx ∩ P0 ∩ Pc0 6= ∅, where P0 is the closure of P0. Based
on these two arrangements, it is allowed three types of decisions, namely: (1) acceptation of H0,
given the family P. That is, the observed sample x does not bring evidence against P0, but it
brings strong evidence against Pc0 (if b ≈ 0); (2) rejection of H0, given the family P. That is, the
observed sample x brings strong evidence against P0 (if a ≈ 0), but it does not bring evidence
against Pc0 ; and (3) without evidence to neither accept nor reject H0, given the family P. That is,
the observed sample x does not bring evidence against either P0 and Pc0 (if b, a 6≈ 0).
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3.2 H0 is sharp and H1 is non-sharp
In this section, H0 is a sharp hypothesis and H1 is a non-sharp hypothesis. Assume the following
condition: for each proper non-empty subset P0 ⊂ P,
P0 ∩ Pc0 6= ∅. (C2)
Condition (C2) is saying that there is no “gap” between P0 and Pc0 as in the Binomial example
presented in Section 3. As dim(P0) < dim(Pc0) = dim(P), the maximum likelihood set Pˆx will
have a non-empty intersection with the closure of Pc0 , for this reason νx(Pc0) = 1. In this case, the
observed data will never produce evidence against H1, therefore, by Definitions 3.2 and 3.1, we
can only find evidence to reject H0. Here, it is allowed only two types of decisions, namely: (2)
rejection of H0, that is, the observed sample x brings strong evidence against P0 (if a ≈ 0); and
(3) without evidence to either accept or reject H0, that is, the observed sample x does not bring
evidence against P0 (if a 6≈ 0).
3.3 H0 is non-sharp and H1 is sharp
In this section, H0 is a non-sharp hypothesis and H1 is a sharp hypothesis. A similar analysis as
was done in Section 3.2 follows. Assume also valid Condition (C2), then as dim(Pc0) < dim(P0) =
dim(P), the maximum likelihood set Pˆx will always have a non-empty intersection with the closure
of P0, this implies νx(P0) = 1. In this case, the observed data will never produce evidence against
H0, therefore, by Definitions 3.2 and 3.1, we can only find evidence to accept H0. Here, it is
allowed only the following two types of decisions, namely: (1) acceptation of H0, that is, the
observed sample x brings strong evidence against Pc0 (if b ≈ 0); and (3) without evidence to
neither accept nor reject H0, that is, the observed sample x does not bring evidence against Pc0 (if
b 6≈ 0).
3.4 Discussion on threshold values
If a (or b) is not sufficiently small, we cannot reject (accept) H0. In this case, we maintain H0 as
a hypothesis to be verified by using further data. In practice, we can define a small threshold for
a and b in terms of the maximum likelihood value. For instance, consider the case Φx(P0) = 〈a, 1〉
(respectively, Φx(P0) = 〈1, b〉 ), if we set the threshold a∗ = 0.01 (or b∗ = 0.01), then we will reject
(or accept) the null hypothesis whenever the highest likelihood produced by the elements in P0 (or
in Pc0) is lesser than 1% of the maximum likelihood value. These thresholds values a∗ and b∗ can be
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derived from loss functions, error probabilities or any other procedure. Moreover, these thresholds
values may take into account the sample size, for the curvature of the likelihood function is affected
by it. Some authors (Royall, 2000; Blume, 2008; Bickel, 2012) advise computing the probability
of misleading evidence for Rx, given in Equation (2.9). The justification is that “observations can
truly constitute strong evidence supporting one distribution when the other is true” (Royall, 2000).
This perspective explicitly assumes a true measure that governs the data behavior. In this paper,
we did not assume, in any moment, the existence of a true measure, here we are just comparing all
likelihoods relative to the maximum likelihood for an observed sample. In this paper, we endorse a
perspective based on the likelihood function and we do not apply a “long-run of trials” perspective
in order to avoid the same controversies of the p-values.
4 Application to the Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium
In this section we apply the above results to analyze genotype frequencies in a population. When
the genotype frequencies of a given population remain constant from generation to generation, it is
said that the population is under the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. In this section, we investigate
three situations, namely: 1) the population is under the Hardy Weinberg equilibrium; 2) the
population is undergoing a regular system of ‘inbreeding’ (when relatives produce offspring); and
3) the population is undergoing a regular system of ‘outbreeding’ (when very genetically different
individuals produce offspring). These situations will be formalized mathematically in the sequel.
Let AA, Aa and aa be the possible genotypes and θ1, θ2 and θ3 their respective population
frequencies, where the parameter vector is θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3) with θ1 + θ2 + θ3 = 1. Let (X ,F ,P) be
a parametric statistical model, where
X = {(y1, y2, y3) ∈ N3 : y1 + y2 + y3 = m},
with m ∈ N a fixed value, F = 2X and each Pθ ∈ P is defined by
Pθ(A) =
∑
(y1,y2,y3)∈A
m!
y1!y2!y3!
θy11 θ
y2
2 θ
y3
3 ,
where A ∈ F is a measurable set. The parameter space is
Θ = {θ ∈ [0, 1]3 : θ1 + θ2 + θ3 = 1}.
For the observed sample x = (y1, y2, y3), the likelihood function and the likelihood ratio statistics
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are, respectively, given by
L(x, θ) =
m!
y1!y2!y3!
θy11 θ
y2
2 θ
y3
3 and λ(x, θ) = cθ
y1
1 θ
y2
2 θ
y3
3 ,
where c =
∏
i:yi>0
(
m
yi
)yi
.
The population is under the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium when
√
θ3 = 1−
√
θ1, for this situation
we define
Θ1 = {θ ∈ Θ :
√
θ3 = 1−
√
θ1}.
The population is under inbreeding pressure when
√
θ3 < 1−
√
θ1, for this case we define
Θ2 = {θ ∈ Θ :
√
θ3 < 1−
√
θ1}.
Finally, the population is under outbreeding pressure when
√
θ3 > 1 −
√
θ1, for this last case we
define
Θ3 = {θ ∈ Θ :
√
θ3 > 1−
√
θ1}.
For more details and discussion on this topic the reader is referred to Emigh (1980). The LR-
measure is
νx(Θi) = sup
θ∈Θi
λ(θ, x)
for i = 1, 2, 3. Notice that
νx(Θ1) = c sup
θ∈Θ1
θy11 θ
y2
2 θ
y3
3 ,
where θ3 = (1−
√
θ1)
2 and θ2 = 1− θ1 − (1−
√
θ1)
2, that is, λ(x, θ) restricted to Θ1 depends only
on θ1, that is,
νx(Θ1) = c sup
θ1∈[0,1]
f(θ1),
where f(z) = zy1(1− z− (1−√z)2)y2(1−√z)2y3 . As f is continuous, f([0, 1]) is closed and it has
a maximum, i.e., sup f([0, 1]) = max f([0, 1]). It is possible to show that the maximum value of f
is attained at
z =
(m+ y1 − y3)2
4m2
.
Therefore, the νx-value for Θ1 is
νx(Θi) = λ(x, θ˜),
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where θ˜ = (θ˜1, θ˜2, θ˜2), θ˜3 = (1 −
√
θ˜1)
2, θ˜2 = 1 − θ˜1 − (1 −
√
θ˜1)
2, and θ˜1 =
(m+y1−y3)2
4m2 . Notice
that,
dim(Θ1) = 1, dim(Θ2) = dim(Θ3) = dim(Θ) = 2,
also note that for θ1, θ2, θ3 > 0, log(λ(x, θ)) is concave. Therefore,
θ̂ ∈ Θ2 or θ̂ ∈ Θ3,
and we have three situations
1. If θ̂ ∈ Θ2, then νx(Θ2) = 1 and νx(Θ3) = νx(Θ1).
2. If θ̂ ∈ Θ3, then νx(Θ3) = 1 and νx(Θ2) = νx(Θ1).
3. If θ̂ ∈ Θ2 ∩Θ3, then νx(Θi) = 1, for i = 1, 2, 3
where A is the closure of set A.
Figure 4 presents in each figure the three sets Θ1, Θ2 and Θ3. The simplex formed by points
(0,0), (0,1) and (1,0) represents the parameter space Θ. The dashed curve illustrates the Hardy-
Weinberg equilibrium. The crosshatched area (below the dashed curve) stands for the inbreeding
restriction and the white area (above the dashed curve) stands for the outbreeding restriction.
Each plot in Figure 4 refers to a specific observe sample, for instance plot (A1) refers to y1 = 1 and
y3 = 2, plot (A2) refers to y1 = 1 and y3 = 3 and so forth. In each plot, the cross mark indicates
the maximum likelihood estimate for (θ1, θ3) and the full lines surrounding the ML estimates are
the smallest contours for which Λα has at least one element in common with Θ1.
On the one hand, in the plots (A1)–(A6), (B1)–(B4), (C6), (D1)–(D4), (E5)–(E6) and (F1) the
maximum likelihood lies in Θ2, that is, it is favoring the inbreeding restriction. Notice that only
for some cases this favoring seems to be relevant (e.g., νx-values less than 0.1):
• (A1): y1 = 1, y3 = 2 ⇒ νx(Θ3) = 0.004,
• (A2): y1 = 1, y3 = 3 ⇒ νx(Θ3) = 0.015,
• (A3): y1 = 1, y3 = 4 ⇒ νx(Θ3) = 0.044,
• (C6): y1 = 5, y3 = 0 ⇒ νx(Θ3) = 0.008.
On the other hand, in the plots (B6), (C1)–(C5), (D6), (E1)–(E4) and (F2)–(F6) the maximum
likelihood lies in Θ3, that is, is favoring the outbreeding restriction. Notice that only for some
cases this favoring seems to be relevant (νx-values less than 0.1):
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Figure 4: The dashed curves represent the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium (Θ1). The crosshatched
area below the dashed line represents the inbreeding condition (Θ2) and the white area above the
dashed line represents the outbreeding condition (Θ3). The cross mark is the maximum likelihood
estimative for each observed sample (y1, y3) and its surrounding full line is the smallest contour
for which Λα has at least one element in common with Θ1 (dashed line). The associated s-values
for Θ1, Θ2 and Θ3 are presented.
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• (F5): y1 = 9, y3 = 6 ⇒ νx(Θ2) = 0.085,
• (F6): y1 = 9, y3 = 7 ⇒ νx(Θ2) = 0.023.
It is also noteworthy that in two cases the maximum likelihood is in Θ2 ∩ Θ3 = Θ1, namely:
(B5) and (D5).
5 Concluding remarks
This paper discussed theoretical properties of the likelihood-ratio measure that go beyond the
probabilistic framework. It was shown that the likelihood ratio approach can be employed by
testing sharp (the dimension of the null parameter space is smaller than the original parameter
space) and non-sharp hypotheses. Three types of decision are possible: accept, reject or maintain
a specific null hypothesis (it depends on the type of the hypothesis and the adopted philosophy).
Moreover, it was established that the likelihood-ratio measure can be used as upper bounds for
posterior probabilities for sets with relative small prior probabilities, this property is in agreement
with the consistency principle of the possibility theory. These results can revitalize the potentiality
and stimulate the use of the likelihood ratio approach in the statistical community.
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